Table of Contents

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I. Introduction

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II. Purpose and Significance

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III. Research Question, Thesis, and Methodology

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IV. The Economy: Evidence for First-Best Policy

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A. Determinants of Immigration

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B. Private Consequences of Immigration

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C. Public Consequences of Immigration

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V. The Polity: Obstacles to First-Best Policy

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A. Public Opinion

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B. The Immigration Lobby: Special and Public Interests

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VI. Equitable Moderation: Consensus Through Second-Best Policy

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A. United States Economic National Interest: Quotas and Preferences

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B. The Mexican Question: Good Neighbor Visas and Diasporic Development

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C. Undocumented Migrants: Earned (and Final) Legalization Program

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D. The Rule of Law: Mutual Responsibility

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E. Agency Development: Resources and Training

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F. National Security: Cross-Agency Cooperation

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G. Cultural Security and Pliability: National Identity and the English Language

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VII. Conclusion

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Bibliography

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VII. Conclusion​

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An equitable moderate approach to immigration law and policy reform would, if implemented, produce the highest possible maximization of the economic national interest of the United States within the political constraints of a modern liberal democracy.  This model eliminates the status quo of a stagnant and outdated immigration infrastructure through a proactive appropriation of highest-value global human and cultural capital with engineered domestic contentedness and strengthened geopolitical ties.  Equitable moderation is located within the same standard economic theory model that has fueled a series of free trade agreements under the Bush Administration’s "competitive liberalization" strategy, yet abated to a second-best, politically feasible reform design in which moderate immigration expansions are coupled with a redistribution of economic gains between the winners and losers of this regenerative architecture.  The institutionalization of expanded employment- and family-based visa quotas, preferences and definitions; the collection of immigrant and nonimmigrant tariffs that offset any actual and potential negative externalities of liberalization, and that redirects migrant funds from black-market smuggling networks to the U.S. Treasury; and the payment of compensatory funds to sending states in exchange for reciprocal gains in comparative advantage trade and foreign state development agreements combine in the manifestation of best-choice reform.  While the author does not claim all-inclusive coverage of the existing and highly fluid problems inherent to the current immigration establishment, nor an exhaustive critique of all existing immigration reform scholarship, it is hoped that this piece will serve as a positive contribution to the ongoing debate and literature with respect to immigration policy reform, taking the movement one step closer towards a comprehensive solution.

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